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1 Introduction 
The monopoly position of the public bureaucracy in providing public services generates 
rents for government employees. In contrast to a model of benevolent bureaucracy, a 
political economics view predicts that bureaucrats will acquire those rents and protect 
them against dissipation. 
In order to understand the checks and balances that restrict the rent-seeking of 
government sector employees, direct measures of rents are desirable. By a rent, we mean 
the utility premium of a worker in the government sector, relative to an equally qualified 
worker in the private sector. Those rents can consist, for example, of wage differentials, 
monetary fringe benefits (like generous pension schemes, higher job security), non-
monetary job amenities (like larger offices, better staffing, offices with better public 
transportation facilities, day-care centers), and, in certain cases, possibilities for 
extracting bribes. Traditional approaches, based on wage differentials, cannot capture all 
those benefits, or are not applicable, because they start from a competitive equilibrium 
where no rents exist. In particular, analyses of wage differentials offer no guidance in 
interpreting any wage differential, either in terms of a rent or compensation. Job queues 
potentially capture the total compensation, but proxy the rent only for the marginal 
position. Further, job queues provide no information on bureaucratic rents, if government 
jobs are allocated by cronyism. Setting reported bureaucratic corruption equal to rents is 
not appropriate either, because it is not clear whether corruption leads to extra benefits 
for public employees, e.g. because there is the possibility of rent dissipation. 
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This paper pursues two goals: (1) As a direct measure to capture the rents involved in the 
government sector, we propose the difference in reported subjective well-being between 
public bureaucrats and people working in the private sector of a country; i.e. if 
bureaucrats report higher life satisfaction, this differential is interpreted as a utility 
premium, or simply a rent. It is argued that employees in the government sector benefit 
from a higher relative advantage or higher rents in countries where there is a larger 
positive gap in reported life satisfaction, ceteris paribus. In contrast to previous 
approaches for measuring rents in the government sector, our approach has the advantage 
of measuring the total net utility differential between people working in the public and 
the private sector. (2) We analyze the conditions determining the rents in the public 
bureaucracy. The life satisfaction differentials between privately and publicly employed 
people are related to political and institutional factors that are argued to facilitate rent 
extraction, as well as to institutional constraints that are proposed as effective controls, 
guaranteeing efficiency in the government sector. 
Rent-seeking activities aim at getting transfers through state activities. As the 
engagement for rents involves the investment of valuable resources, there are less 
resources available for productive economic activity and a pareto-inferior situation is 
achieved. Rent-seeking of private and government actors is thus leading to a lower level 
of welfare overall. Opportunities for bureaucratic rent-seeking are manifold and often tied 
to the several tiers of principal-agent relationships which characterize bureaucracies, i.e. 
those between individual bureaucrats and managers of agencies, those between managers 
of agencies and the legislature, or those between officials and voters. First, there are 
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several characteristics of government bureaus which hamper the use of explicit incentives 
to align the interests of individual bureaucrats with the interests of their superiors. 
Second, informational asymmetries give bureaucrats considerable discretion vis-à-vis the 
legislature. This allows bureaucrats to pursue their own goals via budget and slack 
maximization. Finally, when interest groups succeed in legislating rents, bureaucrats are 
likely to share in these rents. Bureaus have a variety of policy-implementing instruments, 
making them a worthwhile target for rent-seeking activities. The policies enacted by the 
legislature also create property rights, which bureaucrats can sell. 
Our empirical analysis explores rents in the government sector from three different 
angles. First, we emphasize the policies that create rents. These policies result from rent-
seeking activities by interest groups, and protect firms from competition by erecting 
barriers to entry, restricting international trade and implementing price controls. Second, 
the extent to which principal-agent problems can be overcome crucially depends on basic 
government institutions. We concentrate on two aspects that are widely discussed in the 
literature, namely the vertical separation of powers, or fiscal federalism, and the 
horizontal separation of powers, or an independent judiciary. Third, the empirical 
analysis is supplemented by a test to determine whether rents are appropriated via 
corruption. 
We study data on the life satisfaction of government and private sector employees from 
21 European and 17 Latin American countries, based on the European Social Survey and 
the Latino Barometer respectively. For each country, we calculate the relative well-being 
differential of an average worker when employed by the government rather than 
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privately. This approach enables country specific response behavior to be taken into 
account. 
We find a large variation in the life satisfaction of government employees, relative to 
private employees, ranging from a well-being premium for the former of plus 5 percent to 
a disadvantage of minus 3 percent. The variation of these differences across countries is 
robust to the control for selection based on observable characteristics. Relative 
advantages in life satisfaction in the public bureaucracy do, moreover, not simply reflect 
differences in economic development. Rather, taking the level of per capita income into 
account, the proxy for rents in the public bureaucracy is higher when internal competition 
is hampered by administrative obstacles and price controls. Rents are also higher when 
external competition is weakened by regulatory trade barriers. In contrast, rents are lower 
in countries with an affordable independent judicial system and a long democratic track 
record. We can also show that there is a sizeable positive correlation between the degree 
of corruption and the satisfaction gap in a country. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our measure for 
capturing rents, based on data for people’s reported subjective well-being. It is compared 
to previous proxy measures for rents, like wage differentials, queues and perceived 
corruption. Section 3 discusses various theories explaining the existence of rents in the 
government sector. These theories focus on the organizational structure within 
bureaucracies, the institutional structure around them and regulatory policies. The 
empirical analysis is presented in section 4. Rents are measured and then statistically 
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related to factors that are hypothesized to determine them. Section 5 offers concluding 
remarks. 
2 Measurement of Rents in the Public Bureaucracy 
2.1 Life satisfaction differences between employees in the government and private 
sector 
The economic idea of a rent is a utility premium an individual can appropriate due to his 
or her monopolistic position or informational advantage. In order to directly test for rents 
in the public bureaucracy, utility thus has to be measured. We propose to approximate 
this utility premium by the relative difference in reported life satisfaction between 
workers employed by the government and privately employed workers. This approach 
takes advantage of the concept of subjective well-being for economic questions. 
Following the economic tradition of relying on the judgment of the persons directly 
involved, people are considered to be the best judges of the overall quality of their life. 
With the help of representative surveys, it is possible to get indications of individuals’ 
evaluation of their life satisfaction. People evaluate their level of subjective well-being 
with regard to circumstances and comparisons to other persons, past experience and 
expectations of the future. Therefore, behind the score indicated by respondents lies a 
cognitive assessment on the extent to which they judge the overall quality of their lives in 
a favorable way. The measures of reported subjective well-being are thus promising 
empirical approximations to individual utility. They passed a series of validation 
exercises and seem to significantly correlate with true positive inner feelings (see Frey 
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and Stutzer 2002a;b for introductions to the economics of happiness and references to the 
validation literature in psychology). Thus, measures of reported subjective well-being 
offer new opportunities for understanding the effects of employment conditions on 
individual well-being. 
Focusing on life satisfaction allows us to capture the total net benefits of a position in the 
public bureaucracy. Thereby, benefits can go beyond the immediate job, e.g. due to 
advantages on the housing market, or utilization of public services, like education for 
one’s children, pension benefits etc.1 This ‘all-inclusive’ aspect differentiates our 
approach from previous research studying the job satisfaction of public and private sector 
employees (Blanchflower and Oswald 1999; Heywood, Siebert and Wei 2002; Clark and 
Senik 2004). The general idea of identifying (labor market) rents by individuals’ self-
evaluation of their situation is, however, implied in this literature and applied by Clark 
(2003), and Lalive (2002). 
As the net benefits are calculated relative to employees in the private sector, they capture 
the relative advantage of working in the public bureaucracy. Thus if conditions are 
relatively more favorable in the private sector there might also be a negative life 
satisfaction differential. 
Our empirical strategy to measure rents in the bureaucracy can be summarized as follows. 
The utility or life satisfaction increment or decrement from government sector 
employment is isolated in a multivariate regression. The life satisfactionij of individual i 
living in country j is explained by a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if he or she 
is a bureaucrat and 0 otherwise, and a vector of other personal characteristics Zij. The 
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control variables Zij capture personal characteristics along which individuals in the 
government sector and individuals in the private sector might differ from one another, 
and which have an impact on reported life satisfaction, such as sex, age, education, 
marital status, place of residence/type of neighborhood and citizenship status. Income, 
working hours and occupation are not included as control variables, because these job 
characteristics may be important channels through which rents are appropriated. If these 
job characteristics were held constant, the pervasiveness of any rent in the government 
sector would be underestimated. All control variables are transformed into mean 
deviation form, Z ij − Z j . The coefficient of the constant term, β0j, can thus be interpreted 
as the life satisfaction of the average individual living in country j, if he or she were to 
work in the private sector. In order to allow for country specific effects of government 
sector employment, as well as for the control variables on life satisfaction, the regression 
summarized in the following equation (1) is run for each country j separately: 
(1) Life satisfactionij = β0 j + β1 jbureaucratij + β2 j Z ij − Z j( )+ εij . 
With the estimated coefficients of the micro-econometric well-being function, the 
percentage difference in life satisfaction due to public employment in country j, j∆ , can 
be calculated as follows: 
(2) ˆ ∆ j =
ˆ β 1 j
ˆ β 0 j
. 
Standard errors for the country specific relative differentials, ˆ σ ∆ j , are computed using the 
delta method. 
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We propose the relative satisfaction differential ˆ ∆ j  as a proxy for rents in the government 
sector. 
While measures of subjective well-being have the unique conceptual advantage of 
providing an overall evaluation of rents, there are some other conceptual issues which 
hamper a simple application as utility proxies. 
First, people report their life satisfaction on an ordinal scale. In order to calculate a 
relative difference in subjective well-being, the satisfaction scores have, however, to be 
cardinally interpreted. There is evidence that a cardinal treatment of life satisfaction is 
much less of a problem practically than theoretically (Kahneman 1999). Furthermore, 
ordinal and cardinal treatments of satisfaction scores generate quantitatively very similar 
results in micro-econometric well-being functions (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). 
Second, individuals’ use of the response scale might vary, making interpersonal 
comparisons difficult. Individuals may use and evaluate some verbalized categories 
differently, may set anchors in numerical scales or may only use a certain range of the 
response scale to express their subjective well-being. However, for many applications 
within a country, individual specific reporting behavior can either be argued not to be 
correlated with the variable of interest, or can be controlled for in a panel setting. We do 
not see any reason for employees in the government sector to report their subjective well-
being in a systematically different way from employees in the private sector. 
Third, the reporting of life satisfaction is partly culturally influenced (Diener and Tov 
2005), involving all three of the aspects just mentioned. For instance, Latin Americans 
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exhibit high desirability for life satisfaction (Diener 2000). Thus language and culture 
specific reporting behavior might bias any correlation in the cross-country context. 
Accordingly, we propose looking at the relative life satisfaction gap between publicly and 
privately employed people. Calculating a difference within countries cancels out any 
country or culture specific anchor effect, which shifts the average level of reported life 
satisfaction in a country up or down. Setting the difference in relation to the level, 
moreover, allows taking into account that some (language) cultures are reluctant to use 
the entire range of the life satisfaction scale to express their subjective well-being. 
Moreover, measuring relative differentials allows comparing life satisfaction differentials 
resulting from different response scales. 
2.2 Previous approaches 
Rents in the government sector have so far been addressed indirectly with various 
empirical approaches, most importantly wage differentials, queues and perceived 
corruption. While these approaches are interesting in their own right, we argue that life 
satisfaction differentials have important advantages. 
(1) Wage differentials. Various studies compare the wages in the public and the private 
sector. The pattern of findings indicates wage premiums for employees in the central 
government, but not for workers in the non-central levels of the government sector (see 
the survey by Gregory and Borland 1999). 
Monetary payoffs are a salient aspect of jobs and probably often related to rents. 
However, the identification of rents turns out to be rather difficult. According to the 
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theory of compensating wage differentials, differences in salaries reflect differences in 
workplace amenities and disamenities. Rents are absent by assumption of a competitive 
labor market. Any remaining wage differential in an empirical analysis between public 
and private employees is necessarily due to unobserved individual or unobserved job 
characteristics. In a context of incomplete competition, wage differentials, however, 
capture both unobserved characteristics and rents. Accordingly, empirical research tries 
to take into consideration as many individual and job differences as possible to explain 
differences in salaries. Most decomposition studies then attribute ex post the unexplained 
part of a wage equation (or the difference in the estimated coefficients) to economic rents 
captured by employees in the public or private sector. To incorporate all aspects of a job, 
the respective variety of job amenities between sectors and across countries, and hidden 
returns like bribes, is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Probably due to these 
difficulties, we are not aware of any cross-country/cross-regional study that analyzes 
predictions of wage differentials based on theories of rent-seeking. 
Our approach, based on life satisfaction differentials, measures the total rents involved 
without the necessity of having information about every job specific aspect. It allows us 
to analyze empirically differences in rents across countries. 
(2) Job queues. Queues indicate that people are willing to bear costs in exchange for 
expected future benefits (e.g. Krueger, A. B. 1988; Heywood and Mohanty 1995). The 
length of a queue, e.g. the number of applicants for a job in the government sector, might 
thus indicate rents. Results show that people queue for jobs in the federal bureaucracy. 
Job queues have the potential of measuring the total compensation, and not only the wage 
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differential. An application of this measure is, however, difficult, and not only for data 
reasons. In particular, queuing costs can only proxy the rent for the marginal employee. 
More importantly, jobs, which provide rents to their holders, are often assigned to people 
by patronage rather than by an open selection process. Life satisfaction differentials allow 
for the study of rents of intramarginal employees, independent of how they got their job. 
(3) Perceived corruption. Instead of looking at public employees directly in order to 
measure rents, people who interact with public employees can be asked about their 
experiences with them. This is the approach applied with reported corruption. Business 
people, journalists and citizens report their perceived corruption in the government 
sector, i.e., the misuse of public positions for private gains. Perceived corruption is then 
argued to provide a proxy for rents applicable in empirical analyses (Persson, Tabellini 
and Trebbi 2003). It is, however, unclear whether corrupt behavior leads to any utility 
premium at all. First, corruption in the form of bribes might compensate for low salaries 
in certain positions compared to outside opportunities. Second, the benefits from 
corruption might be dissipated in the effort to get and keep a particular position or job. 
With measures of life satisfaction, it is possible to study whether any utility premium or 
rent to employees in the government sector remains when there is more corruption, or 
whether it is used up in the process of defending it. Moreover, bribery and corruption are 
only two of many sources of rents in the public bureaucracy. 
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3 Theories of Bureaucratic Rents 
There are several theoretical reasons why rents in the public bureaucracy are to be 
expected. In the first part of this section, we outline the theoretical framework for why 
rents can exist.2 In particular, the organizational structure of the public bureaus makes it 
difficult to align bureaucrats’ interests with those of their principals, the public. In the 
second part, the framework is extended to provide empirically testable hypotheses for 
when rents are expected to be higher or lower. Two particular aspects are important: 
First, the more the state is engaged in regulatory policies, the more opportunities there are 
to acquire rents. And second, the more the bureaucracy has to act within a set of checks 
and balances, the lower the rents are expected to be. We also discuss why bureaucrats 
may enjoy higher utility for other reasons than the failure to align their interests with 
those of the principal, and why rents may be dissipated in the process of acquiring them. 
3.1 Organizational Structure and Incentives Within Public Bureaus 
The organizational structure of public bureaucracies can explain why, on the one hand, 
incentives are low powered and, on the other hand, legislative control is limited, leaving 
the bureaucracies leeway to maximize budget and slack. 
Bureaucracies are characterized by several tiers of principal-agent relationships. At each 
level, there are many opportunities of bureaucratic rent-seeking. Within bureaucracies, 
there is the relationship between managers of agencies and individual bureaucrats. In this 
relationship, several characteristics of government bureaus hamper the use of explicit 
incentives to align the interests of individual bureaucrats with their superiors. Most 
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notably, there is a multiplicity of dimensions – of tasks, of principals and their often-
conflicting interests about the ends and the means, and of the tiers of management and 
front-line workers (Dixit 2002). Moreover, output is difficult to measure in the 
government sector. After all, a key characteristic of a government bureau is the non-
market nature of its output. These aspects of the organizational structure, in principal, 
allow subordinates in the government sector to withdraw work effort and to pursue their 
own goals, giving them higher utility than if they would pursue the goals set for the 
agency. 
An important principal-agent relationship beyond the eminent bureaucracy involves the 
one between legislators and chief bureaucrats. Bureaucrats hold three pivotal advantages 
in the bargaining situation with their sponsors: (i) the bureau is a monopolistic supplier, 
(ii) this position gives it a monopoly over information, and (iii) it is institutionally 
allowed to make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals. Bureaucrats use this power to 
obtain bigger budgets than those legislatures would want to grant in the absence of these 
distortions (Niskanen 1971). Large budgets make it easier for bureaucrats to pursue their 
goals: ‘salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the 
bureau, ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau’ (Niskanen 1971, p. 
38). Alternatively, the bureaucrats can be assumed to maximize not the total budget, but 
rather discretionary budget or slack, i.e. the difference between the total budget and cost 
of production (Migué and Bélanger 1974). 
However, while an agency may be a monopoly in the sense that no other agency is 
producing that particular output, the manager of the agency is not a monopolist but rather 
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subject to competition within the bureaucracy (Breton and Wintrobe 1982). This may 
limit the predominance of the bureaucracy over elected officials. Further, the legislature 
has authority over the bureau and can structure their bargaining in the way it wants 
(Miller and Moe 1983). Finally, administrative procedures can mitigate problems of 
asymmetric information. The legislature has a rich menu of control techniques at its 
disposal, including competition for budgets among bureaus, ex post sanctions and the 
possibility of enfranchising the politically relevant constituencies in the administrative 
process which monitor bureaus’ behavior (Weingast and Moran 1983; McCubbins, Noll 
and Weingast 1987). However, these instruments are costly and bureaus’ managers are 
not passive. Moreover, bureaucrats carry a considerable amount of political clout as a 
significant minority of the electorate and often the legislature, as well as a small, 
privileged and homogenous interest group (Tullock 1993). 
3.2 Regulatory Policies Creating Possibilities for Rent-Seeking 
Bureaucrats play an important role on the supply side of the political market for rent-
creating government interventions. On the one hand, bureaus have substantial policy-
implementing authority, making them a worthwhile target for rent-seeking activities. On 
the other hand, the policies resulting from the rent-seeking process, even if brokered by 
elected officials, create valuable property rights. Bureaucrats can extract part of the 
created rents, insofar as they have discretion over the provision of these property rights. 
For example, a government official allocating milk quotas to farmers receiving 
government-guaranteed prices, or a customs’ officer, may collect bribes for assigning 
higher quotas or giving passage through customs. The provision of property rights can be 
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influenced by outright corruption or more subtle means, including hiring the relatives of 
officials, or employing the officials themselves upon retirement. 
From the outset, the two main rent-creating government interventions analyzed in the 
rent-seeking literature have been (1) policies sheltering firms from domestic competition 
and (2) policies keeping out foreign competitors (Tullock 1967; Krueger, A. O. 1974). 
Strict regulations function as barriers to entry and, hence, increase incumbent firms’ 
profits. Similarly, tariffs and various other forms of trade restrictions keep out foreign 
competitors. ‘The monopoly rents that the government can help provide are a prize worth 
pursuing, and the pursuit of these rents has been given the name of rent-seeking’ (Mueller 
2003, p. 333). The rent-seeking theory comes in two variants, assigning the bureaucracy 
different roles in the process. The regulatory capture theory considers the creation of the 
regulatory agencies themselves as the prize in the bidding process by interest groups. 
Right from the start, the agencies are captured and promote the regulated interests (Stigler 
1971). Another strand of the theory considers regulations to be pursued mainly for the 
benefits of politicians and bureaucrats (De Soto 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1998). But 
even if regulatory agencies are designed to promote the interests of the regulated industry 
at the outset, there is a constant threat that the rents will be annihilated. Interest groups, 
therefore, have an incentive to strike bargains with the bureaucrats (McChesney 1987). 
Moreover, the higher the rents created by government intervention, the higher are the 
incentives for bureaucrats to engage in malfeasant behavior (Ades and Di Tella 1999). 
Empirical research has shown that both stricter regulation of entry for start-up firms 
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(Djankov et al. 2002), as well as protection from international trade (Ades and Di Tella 
1999), are associated with higher levels of perceived corruption. 
Accordingly, we expect the level of rents measured by life-satisfaction differentials to be 
the higher, (1) the more domestic competition is hampered by regulatory policies and (2) 
the more external competition is restricted by government policies. 
3.3 Institutional Constraints 
At each tier of the multiple principal-agent relationship identified above, the degree of 
informational asymmetries, sanctioning mechanisms and, more generally, the constraints 
on bureaucratic rent-seeking are essentially determined by the constitutional setting of a 
country. Two aspects are particularly important: (1) vertical separation of powers or 
federalism and (2) horizontal separation of powers in the form of judicial independence. 
The degree of decentralization of a country affects various aspects of government 
bureaus. Competition for mobile resources is expected to improve governance by 
increasing the cost to officials who provide public services inefficiently (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980). Sub-national jurisdictions are constrained by this competition for 
mobile resources in regulating economic activity. Federalism thus diminishes the level 
and pervasiveness of economic rent-seeking (Weingast 1995). Competition will also 
drive down bribes to be paid to sub-national bureaus dispersing scarce benefits (Rose-
Ackerman 1978). Further, a closer association between expenditures and revenue 
mobilization, and lower information costs to citizens at the sub-national level, as well as 
more specific tasks particular to a single jurisdiction, may also lead to better 
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accountability of bureaucrats and elected officials (Oates 1999). However, this positive 
view of fiscal federalism has been challenged. Multiple tiers of government could 
weaken accountability, as voters have greater difficulty attributing blame and credit 
(Fisman and Gatti 2002). If decentralization is accompanied by a lack of coordination 
among bureaucrats in extracting bribes for complementary permits, excessive rent 
extraction or ‘overgrazing’ may result. Independent bureaus ignore the negative effects of 
raising their bribes on demand for complementary permits and, hence, the bribes to the 
other bureaus (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). 
Independent courts are an important constraint for administrative decision-making. The 
separation of the creation of laws and regulations from the administration of justice 
prevents the abuse of the power by one branch of government (see e.g. Hayek 1960). 
Constitutional review limits the power of the executive and the legislature to pass laws 
and regulations that benefit themselves or allied interest groups (La Porta et al. 2004). 
Furthermore, an independent judiciary can examine whether a bureau has interpreted the 
law as intended by the enacting legislature, and whether bureaus follow the appropriate 
process in making their decisions (Hanssen 2000). Bureaus are thus constrained by the 
threat that an independent judiciary may reverse their decisions or impose other actions. 
The other branches react accordingly and attempt to undermine judicial independence. By 
regulating judicial procedures, for example, the legislature gains control over the 
outcome and ensures that disputes are resolved so as to favor itself and its clientele 
(Djankov et al. 2003). However, it can be argued that an independent judiciary also 
facilitates rent extraction by the other branches. By immunizing laws from short-run 
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political pressures, an independent judiciary increases the value of legislation sold to 
interest groups (Landes and Posner 1975). 
There is also a time dimension to institutional constraints, influencing how binding they 
are de facto. A system of checks and balances needs time to develop and consolidate 
(Persson and Tabellini 2003). A transition from an autocratic to a more democratic 
government is often accompanied by an increase in corruption, which can be attributed to 
the underdeveloped institutions under the newly formed democracy (Huntington 1968). 
In contrast, rent-seeking activities may be less pervasive in countries recently subjected 
to revolutionary upheaval, as a pre-existing interest group structure is typically weakened 
or eliminated. Accordingly, long existing and stable democracies suffer from internal 
sclerosis, as well-established interest groups successfully defend their members (Olson 
1982). 
The empirical evidence regarding the influence of federalism and judicial independence 
on rents in the bureaucracy is indirect only and focuses on corruption. Moreover, 
evidence regarding federalism is mixed. Fisman and Gatti (2002) find decentralization in 
government expenditure to be strongly and statistically significantly associated with 
lower corruption. Using a dummy variable indicating countries with a federal 
constitution, Person, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) find no relationship, and Treisman 
(2000) finds a positive one. For judicial independence, however, the results are 
unequivocal. Judicial independence is positively associated with different measures of 
economic freedom (La Porta et al. 2004) and higher procedural formalism predicts higher 
perceived corruption (Djankov et al. 2003). Finally, countries with a continuous 
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experience of democracy in their recent history ceteris paribus have lower levels of 
perceived corruption (Treisman 2000; Serra 2004). 
Accordingly, we would expect (1) the relationship between rents and federalism to be 
ambiguous, (2) rents to be lower with higher judicial independence, and (3) longer 
democratic experience in a country to have an ambiguous influence on rents. 
3.4 Alternative Causes for Utility Premiums in the Bureaucracy and Rent 
Dissipation 
So far, the discussion of rents concentrated on situations that allow bureaucrats to capture 
rents because of a failure to align their interests to those of the citizens. However, adverse 
consequences are not necessarily a corollary of bureaucrats enjoying rents. Some utility 
premium for bureaucrats might even be intentional on the part of their principal. A 
principal might offer bureaucrats a wage above their opportunity costs in the private 
sector, in order to reduce the likelihood that bureaucrats sacrifice the public’s interest for 
their own. The size of this wage increase is inversely related to the probability of 
detection, and directly related to the size of potential gains from misbehavior (Becker and 
Stigler 1974; Acemoglu and Verdier 2000). Especially in countries with underdeveloped 
institutions and large gains from misbehavior, a costly efficiency wage may be the lesser 
of two evils (Ades and Di Tella 1999).3 In our empirical investigation, we will analyze to 
what extent rents can be accounted for by higher regular income. 
There are two other reasons for higher utility in the public sector, for which there is no 
obvious argument that they depend on the institutional controls discussed above. First, in 
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many areas of the public sector, such as the military or academia, only a small fraction of 
aspirants get promoted to a permanent position. In these cases, the higher utility enjoyed 
by the regular officers and professors might just reflect the prize of the tournament set up 
by the principal (Prendergast 1999). Second, public bureaucrats may derive more utility 
from their job than their private sector counterparts, because they are intrinsically 
motivated and enjoy carrying out their task (Frey 1997), because of a better matching of 
principals’ and agents’ mission preferences in the government sector (Besley and Ghatak 
2005), or because they are more likely to get utility from the distinction provided by non-
material extrinsic rewards, like titles and orders (Frey 2005). As our interest is primarily 
in the variation of rents across countries, any general level effect does not interfere with 
the empirical analysis. 
Despite the possibility of bureaucratic rent-seeking at each tier of the principal-agent 
relationship, it is not clear whether bureaucrats succeed in capturing any rents at all. The 
rents may be dissipated in the process of acquiring and defending them (Buchanan 1980). 
Similarly, intrinsically motivated agents, sharing the mission of the government bureau, 
are prepared to work for less than they could earn in the private sector. Therefore, 
whether bureaucrats are able to capture rents, and under what conditions they are able to 
do so, are ultimately empirical questions.  
4 Empirical Analysis 
We present the empirical analysis in four steps: First, we introduce the data. Second, the 
average levels of rents in our sample of countries are measured, based on our new 
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approach. Third, we analyze the determinants of rents by explaining the cross-country 
variation in rents, with differences in regulatory policies and institutional constraints. 
Fourth, our measure of rents is correlated with perceived corruption indices in order to 
validate the latter measure and to test whether bureaucrats are able to acquire a part of 
their rents through corrupt behavior. 
4.1 Data 
There are mainly two data sources containing information on people’s life satisfaction, as 
well as their occupation, for a large number of countries: the European Social Survey 
(ESS) for 21 European countries4 and the Latinobarometer (LB) for 17 Latin American 
countries. For robustness checks, we also use the Eurobarometer Survey Series (EB) with 
information for 13 European countries. In all three surveys, random cross-section 
samples in the respective countries are interviewed. The ESS was carried out for the first 
time in 2002/2003, and the surveys of the LB and EB are repeated annually. Data on 
people’s life satisfaction, as well as their occupation, are included in the surveys of 1997, 
2000, 2001 and 2003 of the LB and in fourteen surveys of the EB between 1989 and 
1994. 
Life satisfaction is reported in the ESS using the following question: ‘All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?’ Individuals are 
asked to state their life satisfaction on a scale from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 
(extremely satisfied). The questions asked in the other survey series are similar, though 
responses are elicited on a four-point scale. For the LB, the question reads as follows: ‘In 
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general, would you say that you are satisfied with your life? Would your say that you are 
[4] very satisfied, [3] fairly satisfied, [2] satisfied, or [1] not satisfied?’ 
In the empirical analysis, the sample is restricted to employed and self-employed 
individuals. A dichotomous variable indicates whether an individual is working in the 
public bureaucracy. In the ESS, the variable is constructed on the basis of information 
about the respondents’ industry (according to the EU industry classification, NACE Rev. 
1). It includes people working in the public administration, defense, and compulsory 
social security. Other employed or self-employed people are in the reference category. 
There are 19,288 observations from the ESS.5 1,356 individuals are classified as public 
bureaucrats. For individual countries, the number of observations varies between 524 for 
Italy (of which 33 are bureaucrats) and 1,347 for Germany (of which 88 are bureaucrats).  
In the case of the LB and the EB, the variable is constructed on the basis of information 
about the respondents’ sector of employment. This categorization of the public 
bureaucracy does not only include public administration, but public sector employment in 
total. Accordingly, the proportion of respondents classified as public bureaucrats is 
higher in the LB and the EB than in the ESS. The four waves of the LB used contain 
72,150 observations with non-missing values for life satisfaction and a total of 40,539 
observations when the sample is restricted to the economically active population. Of 
these, 6,587 work in the public sector. The number of observations varies between 1,367 
in Paraguay and 2,954 in Ecuador, with the number of bureaucrats varying between 187 
in Paraguay and 557 in Panama. Finally, the waves from 1989-1994 of the EB offer 
64,470 observations, of which 22,520 are observations for bureaucrats. The number of 
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observations varies between 2,435 for Luxembourg (of which 949 are bureaucrats) and 
11,987 for Germany (of which 3,697 are bureaucrats). 
The restriction of our sample to working respondents leads to lower bound estimates of 
bureaucratic rents for two reasons. First, former government sector employees usually 
enjoy exceptionally generous retirement provisions. Second, public officials are often 
protected from dismissal by special statutes. Hence, former bureaucrats will be 
underrepresented among unemployed people. Generous retirement arrangements and 
greater job security are both likely to be important aspects of bureaucratic rents. 
4.2 Measurement of Rents in the Public Bureaucracy 
Rents in the public bureaucracy are measured by the utility differential of government 
sector employees relative to employees in the private sector, whereby utility is 
approximated by self-reported subjective well-being.  
Based on the three data sources, we estimate micro-econometric well-being functions as 
outlined in equation (1). For the standard socio-demographic characteristics, we find 
similar partial correlations with life satisfaction to those reported in the literature (see e.g. 
Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald 2001 for the Eurobarometer; Graham and Pettinato 
2002 for the Latinobarometer; Frey, Benesch and Stutzer 2005 for the European Social 
Survey). We do not report on the life satisfaction functions for each country in detail. 
Exemplary, the detailed specification for Europe and Latin America as a whole are 
presented in tables A1 to A3 in the appendix. In both regions, public bureaucrats are, on 
average, more satisfied with their life than people working in the private sector, though 
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the result for the ESS is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels. The 
respective coefficients are 0.109 (std. err. 0.097) for the ESS, 0.048 (std. err. 0.013) for 
the LB and 0.045 (std. err. 0.045) for the EB and amount to life satisfaction differentials 
between 1.5 and 2 percent of the life satisfaction reported by an average individual 
working in the private sector. However, these estimates are not very informative, as they 
mask considerable variation across countries. The corresponding estimates for the 
individual countries are presented in figure 1. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
There are four countries with life satisfaction differentials for public employees that are 
larger than plus 5 percent (the highest decile). These are the Czech Republic, Paraguay, 
Poland and Greece. At the other end of the spectrum there are countries in which it is 
more attractive to work in the private sector. In the lowest decile, there are four countries 
with relative differentials that are around minus 3 to minus 4 percent. These are Finland, 
France, Israel and Costa Rica. The relative gaps in life satisfaction are measured with 
different degrees of precision, reflected in the confidence interval for each estimation.6 
These variations in the standard errors of the relative differentials are taken into account 
in the next step of the analysis. 
In this analysis, the differences in life satisfaction between government and private 
employees are taken as a proxy measure of the relative attractiveness of the two sectors. 
This interpretation of relative life satisfaction differentials in single countries has, 
however, to be taken with caution. Whether somebody works in the government or in the 
private sector is not randomly determined. People rather self-select into jobs given the 
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institutional restrictions. They try to find employment in the sector where they expect to 
be relatively better off.  
While it is inherently interesting to understand who is joining the public service, self-
selection might lead to systematic biases in the current analysis. For example, better 
educated people are more likely to join the public administration in many countries. To 
the extent that they are more satisfied with life in general, they contribute to a positive 
raw differential in subjective well-being even though there might be no rent. 
In order to get an unbiased average effect of working in the public bureaucracy on life 
satisfacton, an instrumental variable approach would be necessary. However, the 
instrumental variable approach has proven to be very difficult to apply in the 
determination of public sector specific wage premiums: „[To] identify the selection 
equation most studies of a worker’s choice of sector of employment have used variables 
such as age or education; yet arguably such variables are more appropriate as explanatory 
variables in the earnings regression“ (Gregory and Borland 1999, p. 3599). We thus 
resolve to control for differences in observed individual characteristics (like the level of 
education), as well as unobserved individual characteristics that are correlated with the 
former. This procedure is expected to reduce the bias in calculated differentials. 
More important than any bias in the general level of the life satisfaction differential 
would be distortions that affect the ranking of countries with regard to rents in the public 
bureaucracy. Such distortions would hamper the analysis of the institutional determinants 
of rents. The possible distortions can be tentatively assessed by comparing raw life 
satisfaction differentials with life satisfaction differentials after controlling for individual 
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characteristics. If our proxies for rents are not mere measurement artifacts, they are 
expected to be relatively large for the same countries whether observed characteristics are 
taken into account or not. In fact, a high Spearman rank order correlation between raw 
and corrected life satisfaction differentials of 0.809 is found. Given the stability, we take 
the substantial variation in relative life satisfaction differentials across countries as our 
explanandum for the next section. 
4.3 Determinants of Rents in the Government sector 
4.3.1 Empirical strategy 
Several determinants of rents are explored, as discussed in section 3. Thereby, we see the 
barriers to trade and market entry, as well as constitutional checks and balances in a 
country as different aspects of the same phenomenon, reflecting an ‘equilibrium’ state of 
a weak or strong institutional environment determining bureaucratic rents. Empirically, 
we approach this same phenomenon from those two perspectives, applying different sets 
of explanatory variables as proxies. 
The tested hypotheses are not mutually exclusive but, on the contrary, highlight different 
aspects of bureaucratic rent seeking. Therefore, we test each hypothesis separately. 
A key variable in the literature on rent-seeking and corruption is a country’s economic 
development. Reported corruption is the lower, the higher the GDP per capita in a 
country is. Economic development is an important summary measure, or proxy for a 
functioning state and economy, including the public administration. This is reflected in 
positive correlations between most variables of good governance and GDP per capita. 
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Correlations for our set of variables are provided in table A5 in the appendix. In order to 
empirically study whether some institutional or policy variable explains variation in 
bureaucratic rents, rather than merely picking up the effect of economic development, we 
include GDP per capita in the baseline specification of our analysis. It ensures that we 
study the determinants of rents for economically comparable countries. 
Rents in the government sector, the dependent variable, are taken from our first step 
estimations for single countries. As the dependent variable is measured with unequal 
precision across countries, we have to correct for heteroskedasticity. We estimate GLS 
models and use the inverse of the estimated standard errors of the relative life satisfaction 
differentials as weights. Equation (3) summarizes the specification: 
(3) 
ˆ ∆ j
ˆ σ ∆ j
= γ 0 1ˆ σ ∆ j
+ γ1 x jˆ σ ∆ j
+ γ2 log(y j )ˆ σ ∆ j
+ u j
ˆ σ ∆ j
, 
where ˆ ∆ j  denotes the relative life satisfaction differentials, ˆ σ ∆ j  the corresponding 
standard errors, jx  the key explanatory variable, yj the per capita GDP, and uj the error 
term. 
Before we introduce the individual variables and present the corresponding results, there 
are two things worth noting. First, all indices are rescaled in such a way that they take on 
values between 0 and 10 and have a straightforward interpretation. Higher values of the 
indicator for judicial independence, for example, correspond to more judicial 
independence. Second, as our dependent variable is constructed with surveys covering 
several years, we use average values whenever an indicator is available for more than one 
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year in the period considered. Specifically, all variables based on indices published by 
Gwartney and Lawson (2004) are averages of the original indices for the years 2000, 
2001 and 2002, and all variables based on indices by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2004) are averages of the original indices for the years 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002. The 
descriptive statistics for our explanatory variables are presented in table A4 in the 
appendix. The control variable for economic development is the log of the PPP converted 
per capita GDP (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002).  
4.3.2 Policies weakening economic competition 
Rents in the government sector are hypothesized to depend positively on the degree to 
which policies protect firms from internal and foreign competition.  
We use four variables capturing barriers to entry or the degree of internal competition. 
Probably the most thorough measure of entry barriers has been collected by Djankov et 
al. (2002). It aggregates the time and out-of-pocket costs of all procedures that an 
entrepreneur needs to carry out in order to begin legally operating a firm. In our sample, 
the cost of starting a new business varies from 3 percent of per capita GDP for the United 
Kingdom to 300 percent of per capita GDP for Bolivia.7 Two further variables are based 
on business executives’ perceptions (i) on the extent to which administrative procedures 
are an important obstacle to starting a new business and (ii) on how easy it is in general to 
start a new business (Gwartney and Lawson 2004). As another indicator for internal 
competition, we take an index for the prevalence of price controls in an economy 
(Gwartney and Lawson 2004).8  
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Restrictions on international trade are measured by two variables (Gwartney and Lawson 
2004). The first is a composite index, comprising the government revenues from taxes on 
international trade, the mean tariff rate and the standard deviation of tariff rates. The 
second is again based on a survey capturing the views of business executives. It 
comprehends all trade barriers other than published tariffs and quotas, such as the time 
required for administrative red-tape. 
The results for the policy, or regulatory variables, are compatible with the basic 
hypothesis. According to the regression results in table 1, bureaucrats benefit from entry 
barriers for new firms, impediments to foreign trade and price controls.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The partial correlation coefficient is largest for the variable administrative obstacles 
(table 1, column III). Administrative procedures are the area where bureaucrats have the 
most extensive implementation authority. Furthermore, cumbersome procedures give 
bureaucrats considerable power over prospective entrants. 
Entry barriers in general are measured by two variables (table 1, columns I and II). While 
we find a statistically negative association between the perceived ease of entry and 
bureaucratic rents, there is no relationship between rents and the cost measure of Djankov 
et al. (2002). Price controls, another form of government intervention in domestic 
markets, exhibit a positive effect on bureaucratic rents (table 1, column IV). An increase 
of the indicators for administrative obstacles and price controls by one standard deviation 
is each related to a 1.0 percentage points higher relative life satisfaction differential. 
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For protectionist measures, a similar picture emerges, as in the case of policies against 
internal competition. Bureaucrats benefit mostly from the creation of those property 
rights over which they have an influence and which they administer, namely regulatory 
trade barriers (table 1, column V). An increase in the index for regulatory trade barriers 
by one standard deviation corresponds to an increase in the relative life satisfaction 
differential by 1.5 percentage points. With regard to tariffs and taxes on international 
trade, we find a sizeable positive effect on bureaucratic rents. However, the effect is not 
statistically significantly different from zero (table 1, column VI). 
The results for the sample with the EB data are qualitatively comparable (see table A6 in 
the appendix). The size of the coefficients is slightly smaller, which leads the statistical 
significance to drop below conventional levels for price controls and regulatory trade 
barriers. 
4.3.3 Institutional constraints 
It is hypothesized that competition through fiscal federalism, legal security through a 
judicial system, and uninterrupted experience of democracy are important institutional 
constraints on bureaucratic rent-seeking. We use a large set of indicators to operationalize 
these institutional factors. 
Fiscal decentralization is measured by both the sub-national share of total government 
spending and by the sub-national share of total government revenues. The extent of a 
sub-national authority’s autonomy, in taxation and in the spending of public funds, are 
important aspects of fiscal decentralization. The simple ratios between sub-national taxes 
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and total taxes, or between sub-national revenues and total revenues, however, severely 
overestimate this autonomy. The central government may set the tax rate, leaving sub-
national authorities as mere tax collectors, without any influence on the allocation of 
resources or redistribution. Therefore, we count only those revenues as sub-national 
revenues where sub-national governments possess full autonomy to set their own tax rate. 
The variable is computed using information of an OECD (2000) study on sub-national 
taxing powers. Unfortunately, this information is only available for a small number of 
countries.9 With regard to expenditures, no comparable information on expenditure 
autonomy is available. However, we do not count transfers to other levels of government 
as sub-national expenditures. The data on sub-national expenditure shares are averages 
over the years 1994 to 1996 and are from the World Bank (2001), Stein (1999) and 
Treisman (2002). The variable for expenditure share varies in the sample from 2.4 
percent for Panama to 48.1 percent for Switzerland, and the variable on revenue 
decentralization varies from 0 percent for Poland to 35 percent for Switzerland. 
Four variables capture the degree to which the judiciary is independent from the other 
branches of the government, and the degree to which ordinary people have access to the 
judicial system. The first two are based on the perceptions of business executives about 
the judicial system in the country in which they operate (Gwartney and Lawson 2004). 
The first measures the extent to which a trusted legal framework exists for private 
business to challenge the legality of government actions or regulations. The second 
measures judicial independence, or the absence of interference by the government or 
parties in any disputes. The third is an indicator collected by Djankov et al. (2003). It 
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measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level 
civil trial courts. The fourth variable captures the affordability of a country’s court system 
and is based on a survey of small firms (World Bank 2000; 2002).10  
The idea, that a system of checks and balances might need time to develop and 
consolidate, is captured with a dummy variable for whether the country experienced 
uninterrupted democracy from 1950 to 1995 (Treisman 2000). 
The general pattern of the results for the institutional variables is that fiscal 
decentralization has no effect on bureaucratic rents, or at least none that is statistically 
significant, and that judicial constraints and uninterrupted experience of democracy are 
related to systematically lower rents of public employees. 
[Table 2 about here] 
More specifically, the fraction of sub-national expenditure in total government 
expenditure seems to have no effect on the rents enjoyed by bureaucrats (table 2, column 
I). The effect of sub-national revenue autonomy is quantitatively large (table 2, column 
II). However, owing to the small number of countries in the sample, the effect cannot be 
estimated with adequate precision. There are two interpretations for the lack of a 
statistically significant constraining effect of fiscal decentralization. On the one hand, 
there are conflicting theoretical predictions for the effect of decentralization on rent 
extraction (as discussed in section 3.3). This fits the mixed empirical evidence on the 
effect of decentralization on corruption and might indicate that countervailing effects 
cancel each other out. On the other hand, the failure to detect an effect may be due to data 
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problems. The quantitatively large effect for sub-national revenue autonomy suggests that 
indicators capturing the theoretically essential aspects of fiscal decentralization more 
closely may well produce robust results, if available for a larger sample of countries. 
Access to an independent and impartial judiciary is an important constraint on rent-
seeking activities by bureaucrats. All results have the expected sign and are, except for 
the coefficient for the formalism index of Djankov et al. (2003), statistically significantly 
different from zero. Representative of all results, figure 2 shows the scatterplot and the 
partial correlation between the relative life satisfaction differentials and impartial courts, 
as well as the corresponding 95 percent confidence interval. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
In order to assess the size of the effects, an increase of the indicators by one standard 
deviation is considered. The increment of the relative life satisfaction differentials lies 
between around 1.0 percentage point for the affordability index and around 1.5 
percentage points for the indices measuring judicial independence and impartiality of 
courts. The difference in court impartiality between Venezuela and Denmark translates 
into a difference in relative life satisfaction of 5 percentage points. Excluding the Czech 
Republic, the relative life satisfaction differentials span over 11 percentage points. Thus, 
the estimated effects for judicial constraints are sizeable. 
Another sizeable effect is estimated for longstanding experience with democratic 
governance. The relative life satisfaction differential is, on average, around 3.5 
percentage points smaller in countries with uninterrupted democracy since 1950. This 
 35
supports the hypothesis that checks and balances need time to evolve and are relatively 
more important for bureaucratic rents than Olson type sclerosis. 
The results for the institutional variables are very similar if estimated with the EB instead 
of the ESS data, with two exceptions (see table A7 in the appendix). The result for the 
affordability of the legal system vanishes. In contrast, the coefficient for the indicator of 
procedural formalism increases, both in size and statistical significance. 
4.4 Acquisition of Rents and Perceived Corruption 
Can public employees acquire rents through corruption? Measures of perceived 
corruption are a widely used proxy for rents in the government sector. However, as 
argued in section 3, it is an empirical question whether bureaucrats can acquire rents via 
corruption, or whether gains from corruption are either dissipated or compensate for 
lower salaries. Our measure of rents allows for the empirical testing of whether higher 
corruption is correlated with higher rents. 
We measure the pervasiveness of corruption in a country by two variables. The first 
variable is an aggregate corruption perception indicator, constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2004). This is the most sophisticated corruption index currently available. 
It aggregates surveys of perceived corruption across countries, based on the views of 
business people, risk analysts, investigative journalists and the general public, by using 
an unobserved component model. The focus is on kickbacks in public procurement, the 
embezzlement of public funds and the bribery of public officials. The second corruption 
indicator specifically captures bureaucratic corruption (Gwartney and Lawson 2004). It is 
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based on a survey measuring perceptions of business executives about the frequency of 
irregular, additional payments, connected with import and export permits, business 
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loan applications. The 
two indices are highly correlated for our sample (ρ = 95.3). 
We find a close positive association between corruption and bureaucratic rents for the 
sample considered. Figure 3 visualizes the positive statistical association for the second 
indicator. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Table 3 presents the complete regression results for both corruption indices. As can be 
seen from table 3, columns I and III, the relative life satisfaction differential increases by 
0.8 percentage points for every one point increase on the eleven point scale of the index 
measuring general corruption, and by 1.1 percentage points for every one point increase 
of the index measuring bureaucratic corruption. The magnitude of these coefficients is 
sizeable and comparable across the two indices. An increase of one of the corruption 
indices by one standard deviation entails an increment in the life satisfaction differential 
of 2 percentage points, a magnitude comparable to the difference in the level of rents 
between Norway or Sweden on the one hand and Slovenia on the other hand. A similar 
thought experiment can be conducted for Paraguay, the country with the highest 
corruption level and the second highest life satisfaction differential. If corruption could 
be eradicated, bureaucratic rents would practically disappear: the life satisfaction 
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differential would lie around -0.5 percent for the index measuring irregular payments to 
bureaucrats and around 0.4 percent for the index measuring general corruption.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Overall, corruption and the level of economic development explain a limited fraction of 
bureaucratic rents, amounting to an R2 of 0.15 and 0.16. This leaves sufficient scope for 
other factors to contribute to our understanding of rents in the government sector.  
The results are very similar for the sample with less European countries, based on the EB. 
Columns I and III of table A8 in the appendix show the regression results. The partial 
correlations between bureaucratic rents and corruption are marginally stronger for both 
corruption indices. 
In a robustness analysis, we study whether the results may be driven by a confounding 
factor, without corruption having anything to do with bureaucratic rents. As there is no 
obvious candidate for such a confounding factor, we include the three most robust 
determinants of corruption in the regression. These are the percentage of the population 
belonging to the Protestant religion, political stability and, as in all regressions, the level 
of economic development (Treisman 2000; Serra 2004).11 Data on religious affiliation 
come from La Porta et al. (2004), the Central Intelligence Agency (1992) and the 
Slovenian statistical office (1996). The indicator on political stability is borrowed from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004). 
Columns II and IV in table 3 depict the results of this robustness test. The positive 
relationship between corruption and rents holds, controlling for the most important 
 38
determinants of corruption. In the case of general corruption, the coefficient increases by 
50 percent (table 3, columns I and II), and in the case of irregular payments to 
bureaucrats, the coefficient is stable (table 3, columns II and IV). The positive 
relationship is only slightly less robust for the sample based on the EB data (table A8 in 
the appendix, columns II and IV). The magnitude of the coefficients decreases by around 
30 percent. 
So far, we have interpreted the partial correlation between corruption and bureaucratic 
rents as if it would reflect benefits like bribes, contributing to public bureaucrats’ well-
being. However, besides this “literal” interpretation, there are at least two other 
interpretations. On the one hand, weak institutional constraints may breed corruption and 
simultaneously other forms of bureaucratic rent-seeking, as they facilitate slack. In such a 
situation, managers of government bureaus can maintain an oversized staff and a multi-
tiered hierarchy, thus rewarding many employees with leading positions and otherwise 
prestigious and pleasant jobs. At the same time, the workload for the individual 
bureaucrat is reduced. According to this interpretation, the partial correlation between 
corruption and rents would be reduced if it is controlled for alternative forms of 
bureaucratic rent seeking (to the extent that these alternative forms are correlated with 
corrupt rent-seeking). 
Alternatively, it could be explored whether low corruption reflects the use of efficiency 
wages. Empirical research has shown that high relative wages are associated with low 
levels of corruption in less developed countries (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001). In 
case efficiency wages are applied and work, larger parts of rents for bureaucrats are due 
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to salary premiums in low corruption countries rather than in high corruption countries, 
ceteris paribus. When controlling for (relative) income, the partial correlation between 
corruption and the relative life satisfaction differential would increase and reveal the total 
effect of corruption on rents. 
The ESS contains detailed information on respondents’ working hours and official 
income. This allows us to address the alternative interpretations. Table 4, columns I and 
III, repeat the basic regressions of the relative life satisfaction differentials on corruption 
for the sample of 21 European countries covered by the ESS. Columns II and IV show 
the regression results for relative life satisfaction differentials that are calculated, holding 
individual income and working hours constant. The size of the coefficients decreases by 
between a fourth and a fifth if income and working hours are controlled for. Hence, 
corruption seems to go hand in hand with bureaucratic rent-seeking, in the form of 
reduced work time and higher salaries. The results thus provide no evidence for the 
efficiency wage hypothesis for our sample of European countries.  
 [Table 4 about here] 
5 Concluding Remarks 
A new measure is proposed that directly approaches the idea of rents in the public 
bureaucracy as a utility premium of government sector workers relative to their private 
sector equivalent. The monopoly position of the public bureaucracy in providing public 
services and regulations creates various possibilities for bureaucrats to acquire rents. 
Those rents can involve wage differentials, monetary and non-monetary fringe benefits, 
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bribes etc. As previous approaches had difficulty in measuring the net total of these rents, 
we rely on information about people’s reported life satisfaction. This new approach 
allows to capture people’s overall evaluation of their situation, and thus to directly 
approximate total net rents. In contrast to the approach based on wage differentials, the 
approach is not plagued with the necessity of controlling for all job amenities and 
disamenities. 
In our empirical analysis, we measure, ceteris paribus, the difference in life satisfaction 
between people working in the government sector and people working in the private 
sector within a country. The result is the average rent created, and not dissipated, in the 
public bureaucracy, taking into account country-specific factors, which affect employees 
in both sectors alike. We find that the relative advantage of working in the government 
sector differs substantially across countries. In accordance with theories on rent-seeking, 
we find that the differences in rents can be partly accounted for by country differences in 
regulatory policies and differences in institutional constraints. In particular, independent 
courts restrict the leeway of public bureaucracy and, as a consequence, government sector 
employees experience lower rents on average. Our proxy measure of rents also correlates 
with widely used perceived corruption indices. The fact that rents positively correlate 
with corruption shows that the benefits acquired through corruption are neither 
completely dissipated, nor do they compensate for potentially lower regular salaries in 
the government sector. 
In our study, we focus on differences in labor market rents between the public and the 
private sector, and try to explain the variation across countries. This leaves at least three 
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questions open. First, how is the level of well-being in general affected by the creation of 
rents in the public bureaucracy? According to political economics, rent-seeking involves 
the unproductive use of resources and is distorting relative prices, and is thus reducing 
the overall efficiency of an economy. One therefore expects that rents for public 
bureaucrats are associated with a lower average level of well-being in a society. Second, 
are there beneficiaries of bureaucratic rent-seeing in the private sector? People working in 
protected industries are expected to be relatively better off then the rest. Larger rents in 
the public bureaucracy might thus co-exist with larger variation of life satisfaction in the 
private sector. Third, how are rents, if there are any, distributed within the public 
bureaucracy? While it is likely that possibilities to acquire rents differ between the 
hierarchical levels within the public bureaucracy, there is also the possibility of 
widespread rent sharing. So far, data restrictions prevent us from further study of these 
relevant extensions. 
Our new methodological approach can be applied to study other forms of rents outside of 
the government sector, where market imperfections have to be assessed. For example, it 
can be studied to what extent people exposed to environmental disadvantages are 
compensated on the housing and labor market. The approach can also be applied to study 
groups (e.g. minorities or women) that are potentially discriminated on the labor market. 
More generally, our analysis demonstrates that life satisfaction data can be applied to 
validate political economics theories in a new way. Recent research in this vein, for 
example, successfully contributes to the understanding of partisan models of political 
business cycles (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005). We show that differences in reported 
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life satisfaction provide new insights into theories on rent-seeking in the public 
bureaucracy. Public bureaucrats are not only benevolent, but acquire rents if the 
restrictions are loose. Those rents are not completely dissipated and lead public 
bureaucrats to be more satisfied with their life in general than people working in the 
private sector. 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1 The approach also allows us to capture any disutility from working in the public bureaucracy. For 
example, social status associated with being a bureaucrat may be positive or negative. Similarly, corrupt 
bureaucrats may get some negative utility from acting illegally. Or, working in a hierarchy might reduce 
people’s job satisfaction and consequently their life satisfaction (Frey and Benz 2004). 
2 Rents are, of course, also possible in the private sector. This is, e.g., in industries with monopoly power, 
or professions where large entry barriers exist like the liberal professions. These rents affect the distribution 
of subjective well-being within the private sector. Overall, they are expected to reduce the level of welfare. 
The arguments for within a sector are thus the same as for the distribution between government and private 
sector employment. 
3 If efficiency wages are paid in order to prevent misuse of bureaucratic leeway, the prediction of the 
previous section regarding the relationship between institutional constraints and rents in the public sector 
remains unchanged: The weaker the institutional constraints, the higher are rents either through reduced 
work effort, corruption etc. or through higher (efficiency) salaries. It is, however, questionable whether, 
under weak institutional conditions, “optimal” efficiency wages are introduced.  
4 Hungary is a further country covered by the European Social Survey. Hungary cannot be included in our 
analysis because information on respondents’ industry is missing.  
5 Originally, there are 42,093 observations in the ESS with non-missing values for life satisfaction. Of 
these, 21,518 observations are excluded because the respondent was neither employed nor self-employed in 
the week preceding the interview or because his/her main income source is neither wage nor income from 
self-employment. Furthermore, 1,287 observations are excluded because it is not known in which industry 
the respondent works, leaving a total of 19,288 observations. 
6 Five countries, the Czech Republic, Paraguay, Austria, Argentina and Panama, exhibit positive relative 
differentials, and two countries, Costa Rica and Finland, exhibit negative relative differentials that are 
different from zero in a statistically significant way. The estimates that cannot statistically significantly be 
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differentiated from zero encompass three groups: First, countries with a positive life satisfaction differential 
that is measured imprecisely, such as in Poland, Greece, Germany and Peru; second, countries with a 
negative life satisfaction differential that is measured imprecisely, such as in Switzerland, France and 
Israel; third, countries with no life satisfaction differential at all, such as Italy, Sweden, Honduras and 
Norway. 
7 This variable is missing for Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Luxembourg, Nicaragua and 
Paraguay. 
8 Countries are given a minimum value of 0 if no price controls or marketing boards are present, a value of 
2 if price controls are limited to industries with economies of scale, a value of 4 if price controls are applied 
in a few other industries, such as agriculture, and still higher ratings the more frequent price controls are, up 
to a maximum value of 10 for the widespread use of price controls throughout various sectors of the 
economy. 
9 The variable on the revenues of sub-national governments, where they possess full autonomy to set the 
tax rate as a share of total revenues, can be computed for Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The variable on the sub-national share of total government spending 
is available for all countries in the sample, except for Greece. 
10 This variable is missing for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay and Switzerland. The formalism index is missing for 
Nicaragua. 
11 British colonial heritage, and a long and uninterrupted experience of democracy, are further robust 
determinants of corruption (Treisman 2000; Serra 2004). However, given our sample of European and 
Latin American countries, the former variable has little meaning and would equal a dummy for Ireland, 
Israel and the United Kingdom. The latter variable is used as a key explanatory variable. 
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Table 1. Competition and rents in the public bureaucracy  
Dependent variable       
Life satisfaction differential 
for public bureaucrats I II III IV V VI 
Internal competition       
 Total cost of market entry 8E-5 
(0.010) 
     
 Ease of starting business  -0.008(*) 
(0.004) 
    
 Administrative obstacles   0.011(*) 
(0.006) 
   
 Price controls    0.007* 
(0.003) 
  
External competition       
 Tariffs and taxes on inter- 
  national trade 
    0.009 
(0.006) 
 
 Regulatory trade barriers      0.010(*) 
(0.005) 
Control variable       
 Log(GDP per capita) -0.006 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
Constant 0.064 
(0.068) 
-0.034 
(0.052) 
-0.109 
(0.080) 
-0.036 
(0.045) 
-0.039 
(0.058) 
-0.151 
(0.103) 
Number of observations 31 38 38 38 38 38
R2 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.09
Notes: (1) Generalized least square estimations; (2) * is significant at the 95 percent level, and (*) at the 90 percent level; (3) 
standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: European Social Survey 2002/2003, Graham and Felton (2005) based on Latinobarometer 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003, 
Gwartney and Lawson (2004) and Djankov et al. (2002). 
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Table 2. Institutions and rents in the public bureaucracy   
Dependent variable        
Life satisfaction differential 
for public bureaucrats I II III IV V VI VII 
Fiscal federalism        
 Expenditure share of sub-
national levels 
2E-4 
(4E-4) 
      
 Revenue share (rate 
autonomy) 
 -0.066 
(0.052) 
     
Judiciary        
 Impartial courts   -0.007* 
(0.003) 
    
 Judicial independence    -0.005(*) 
(0.003) 
   
 Procedural formalism     0.005 
(0.006) 
  
 Affordability of legal system      -0.012** 
(0.004) 
 
Uninterrupted democracy       -0.034** 
(0.012) 
Control variable        
 Log(GDP per capita) -0.004 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
Constant 0.035 
(0.046) 
-0.071 
(0.150) 
-0.098 
(0.069) 
-0.091 
(0.072) 
-0.044 
(0.091) 
0.045 
(0.065) 
-0.107 
(0.058) 
Number of observations 37 15 38 38 37 25 38
R2 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.29 0.20
Notes: (1) Generalized least square estimations; (2) ** is significant at the 99 percent level, * at the 95 percent level, and (*) at the 90 percent level; (3) standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Sources: European Social Survey 2002/2003, Graham and Felton (2005) based on Latinobarometer 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003, World Bank (2000; 2001; 2002), Stein 
(1999), Treisman (2000; 2002), OECD (2000), Gwartney and Lawson (2004), and Djankov et al. (2003). 
 
 
  53 
 
Table 3. Corruption and rents in the public bureaucracy 
Dependent variable     
Life satisfaction differential 
for public bureaucrats I II III IV 
Corruption     
 General corruption 0.008* 
(0.003) 
0.012* 
(0.005) 
  
 Irregular payments   0.011* 
(0.004) 
0.011* 
(0.005) 
Control variables     
 Protestants  -3E-5 
(2E-4) 
 -6E-5 
(2E-4) 
 Political stability  0.006 
(0.005) 
 0.001 
(0.004) 
 Log(GDP per capita) 0.019(*) 
(0.010) 
0.021* 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.009) 
0.019(*) 
(0.009) 
Constant -0.197(*) 
(0.099) 
-0.271* 
(0.116) 
-0.208* 
(0.097) 
-0.210* 
(0.100) 
Number of observations  38  38  38  38 
R2  0.15  0.19  0.16  0.17 
Notes: (1) Generalized least square estimations; (2) * is significant at the 95 percent level, and (*) at the 90 
percent level; (3) standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: European Social Survey 2002/2003, Graham and Felton (2005) based on Latinobarometer 1997, 
2000, 2001 and 2003, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004), Gwartney and Lawson (2004), Heston, 
Summers and Aten (2002), La Porta et al. (2004), Central Intelligence Agency (1992), and Statisticni urad 
republike slovenije (1996). 
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Table 4. Corruption and rents in the public bureaucracy: the role of personal income and 
working time 
Dependent variable     
Life satisfaction 
differentials for public 
bureaucrats 
I 
Excl. channels 
II 
Incl. income and 
working hours 
III 
Excl. channels 
IV 
Incl. income and 
working hours 
Corruption     
 General corruption 0.010 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
  
 Irregular payments   0.017* 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
Control variable     
 Log(GDP per capita) -0.010 
(0.032) 
-0.021 
(0.034) 
-0.001 
(0.029) 
-0.014 
(0.033) 
Constant 0.010 
(0.330) 
0.207 
(0.347) 
-0.012 
(0.306) 
0.126 
(0.339) 
Number of observations  21  21  21  21 
R2  0.21  0.18  0.30  0.22 
Notes: (1) Generalized least square estimations; (2) * is significant at the 95 percent level; (3) standard errors in parentheses; 
(4) the dependent variable is the relative life satisfaction differential between public and private sector workers in columns I 
and III, and between public and private sector workers with identical household income and working hours in columns II and 
IV. 
Source: European Social Survey 2002/2003, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004), Gwartney and Lawson (2004). 
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Figure 1. Relative life satisfaction differentials for Europe and Latin America
Notes: This graph plots estimates for the relative life satisfaction differentials and the corresponding 90 percent confidence
interval. The relative life satisfaction differentials are computed by dividing the coefficients for government sector employment
by the coefficient for the intercept estimated in micro-econometric life satisfaction functions for the 38 countries. The standard
errors of the relative differentials are computed using the delta method.
Sources: European Social Survey 2002/2003, and Graham and Felton (2005) based on Latinobarometer 1997, 2000, 2001 and
2003.
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Figure 2. Independent judiciary and rents in the public bureaucracy 
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Notes: (1) Generalized least square estimation; (2) shaded area is 95 percent confidence interval; 
(3) life satisfaction differentials are corrected for log(GDP per capita) and the constant. 
Sources: European Social Survey 2002/2003, Graham and Felton (2005) based on Latino-
barometer 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003, Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) and Gwartney and 
Lawson (2004). 
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Figure 3. Corruption and rents in the public bureaucracy 
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Notes: (1) Generalized least square estimation; (2) shaded area is 95 percent confidence interval; (3) 
life satisfaction differentials are corrected for log(GDP per capita) and the constant. 
Sources: European Social Survey 2002/2003, Graham and Felton (2005) based on Latinobarometer 
1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003, Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) and Gwartney and Lawson (2004). 
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Table A1. Estimations incl. control variable for Europe as a whole; part 1 
Dependent variable  
Life satisfaction Coefficient Robust st. error 
Public bureaucracy   
Public bureaucracy 0.109 0.097 
Individual characteristics   
Male Reference group 
Female 0.190** 0.050 
Age -0.081** 0.014 
Age2 0.001** 2E-4 
Married; with partner 0.470** 0.078 
Married; without partner -0.380 0.342 
Separated; with partner 0.242 0.338 
Separated; without partner -0.468* 0.206 
Divorced; with partner 0.491** 0.183 
Divorced; without partner -0.353* 0.138 
Widowed; with partner 0.518 0.720 
Widowed; without partner -0.820* 0.329 
Single; with partner 0.539** 0.091 
Single; without partner Reference group 
Sq. root of household size -0.033 0.070 
Not completed primary ed. Reference group 
Primary education -0.220 0.292 
Lower secondary ed. 0.414 0.275 
Upper secondary ed. 0.608* 0.272 
Post sec., non-tertiary ed. 0.670 0.284 
Tertiary ed., 1st stage 0.882** 0.274 
Tertiary ed., 2nd stage 0.715* 0.284 
Table to be continued. 
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Table A1. Estimations incl. control variable for Europe as a whole; part 2 
Citizen 0.127 0.176 
Foreigner Reference group 
Living in a big city -0.711** 0.129 
Living in suburbs -0.331** 0.129 
Living in a small town -0.458** 0.121 
Living in a village -0.264* 0.120 
Living in the countryside Reference group 
Constant   
Constant 7.041** 0.025 
Number of observations  19,288  
Number of public bureaucrats  1,356  
R2  0.05  
Notes: (1) Least squares estimation (incl. intra- and inter-country weights); all control variables 
are transformed into mean deviation form such that the coefficient of the constant term can be 
interpreted as the life satisfaction of the average individual, if he/she were to work in the private 
sector; (2) ** is significant at the 99 percent level, * at the 95 percent level, and (*) at the 90 
percent level; (3) results are not shown for dummies, indicating that sex, age, marital status, 
household size, education, citizenship status, and community type are not available, as well as for 
a dummy indicating that a subject belongs to the highest income class. 
Source: European Social Survey 2002/2003. 
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Table A2. Estimations incl. control variable for Europe as a whole 
 
Dependent variable 
  
Life satisfaction Coefficient Robust st. error 
Public bureaucracy   
Public bureaucracy 0.045** 0.008 
Individual characteristics   
Male Reference group 
Female 0.021** 0.008 
Age -0.014** 0.002 
Age2 2E-4** 2E-5 
Married 0.089** 0.011 
Living together 0.010 0.019 
Separated -0.275** 0.043 
Divorced -0.161** 0.023 
Widowed -0.097** 0.033 
Single Reference group 
Education, up to 15 years Reference group 
Education, 16-19 years 0.043** 0.010 
Education, 20 years and more 0.127** 0.011 
In education 0.072 0.049 
Living in a big city -0.087** 0.010 
Living in a small town -0.036** 0.009 
Living in the countryside Reference group 
Constant   
Constant 2.670** 0.005 
Number of observations   64,470 
Number of public 
bureaucrats 
  22,520 
R2   0.03 
Notes: (1) Least squares estimation (incl. inter-country weights); all control variables are 
transformed into mean deviation form such that the coefficient of the constant term can be 
interpreted as the life satisfaction of the average individual, if he/she were to work in the private 
sector; (2) ** is significant at the 99 percent level; (3) results are not shown for dummies, 
indicating that sex, age, marital status, education, and community type are not available, as well as 
for a dummy indicating that a subject belongs to the highest income class. 
Source: Euro-Barometer Survey Series, 1989-1994. 
 
 61 
Table A3. Estimations incl. control variable for Latin America as a whole 
 
Dependent variable 
  
Life satisfaction Coefficient Robust st. error 
Public bureaucracy   
Public bureaucracy 0.048** 0.013 
Individual characteristics   
Male Reference group 
Female -0.039** 0.010 
Age -0.014** 0.002 
Age2 2E-4** 2E-5 
Married -0.010 0.012 
Divorced -0.077** 0.019 
Single Reference group 
Illiterate -0.026 0.024 
Not completed primary ed. Reference group 
Primary education 0.018 0.018 
Not completed secondary ed. -0.002 0.017 
Completed secondary ed. -0.028(*) 0.017 
Not completed university -0.009 0.021 
Completed university 0.062** 0.019 
Living in the capital -0.157** 0.013 
Living in a big city -0.182** 0.014 
Living in a small town/village Reference group 
Constant   
Constant 2.670** 0.005 
Number of observations   40,539 
Number of public 
bureaucrats 
  6,587 
R2   0.05 
Notes: (1) Ordinary least squares estimation; all control variables are transformed into mean 
deviation form such that the coefficient of the constant term can be interpreted as the life 
satisfaction of the average individual, if he/she were to work in the private sector; (2) ** is 
significant at the 99 percent level, and (*) at the 90 percent level; (3) results are not shown for 
dummies, indicating that sex, age, marital status, education, and community type are not available, 
as well as for a dummy indicating that a subject belongs to the highest income class. 
Source: Graham and Felton (2005) based on Latinobarometer 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003. 
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Table A4. Descriptive statistics      
Variable 
 
Number of 
observations
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max. 
Corruption      
 General corruption a  38 3.43 2.34 0.02 7.14 
 Irregular payments b  38 3.29 1.74 0.50 6.50 
Competition      
 Total cost of market entry c  31 0.46 0.52 0.03 3.01 
 Ease of starting business b  38 5.08 1.40 2.50 8.10 
 Administrative obstacles b  38 5.77 0.81 3.40 7.10 
 Price controls b  38 3.72 1.43 0.70 7.00 
 Tariffs and taxes on international trade b  38 1.53 0.76 0.10 3.10 
 Regulatory trade barriers b  38 2.54 1.49 0.50 5.20 
Institutions      
 Expenditure share of sub-national levels d, e, f  37 21.07 12.65 2.40 48.10 
 Revenue share (rate autonomy) g  15 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.35 
 Impartial courts b  38 5.41 2.79 0.80 9.30 
 Judicial independence b  38 5.57 2.33 1.70 8.90 
 Procedural formalism h  37 4.17 0.97 2.40 5.91 
 Affordability of legal system d  25 4.61 0.90 3.15 6.42 
 Uninterrupted democracy f  38 0.42 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Source: a Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004), b Gwartney and Lawson (2004), c Djankov et al. (2002), d World Bank (2000; 2001; 
2002), e Stein (1999), f Treisman (2000; 2002), g OECD (2000) and h Djankov et al. (2003). 
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Table A5. Correlation matrix         
 Life satisf. 
differential 
General 
corruption 
Irregular 
payments
Total cost of 
market entry 
Ease of 
starting b.
Admin. 
obstacles 
Price 
controls 
Taxes on 
intern. trade
Reg. trade 
barriers 
Life satisfaction differential 1.00                 
General corruption 0.37 1.00        
Irregular payments 0.60 0.93 1.00       
Total cost of market entry -0.08 0.81 0.67 1.00      
Ease of starting business -0.14 -0.85 -0.74 -0.94 1.00     
Administrative obstacles 0.14 0.93 0.81 0.93 -0.94 1.00    
Price controls 0.34 0.67 0.77 0.55 -0.43 0.55 1.00   
Taxes on international trade 0.35 0.93 0.87 0.66 -0.67 0.85 0.65 1.00  
Regulatory trade barriers 0.40 0.94 0.92 0.71 -0.69 0.85 0.78 0.97 1.00 
Exp. share of subnat. levels -0.11 -0.29 -0.41 -0.11 0.12 -0.15 -0.52 -0.21 -0.25 
Revenue share (rate autonomy) -0.36 -0.59 -0.59 -0.50 0.47 -0.48 -0.72 -0.42 -0.51 
Impartial courts -0.40 -0.91 -0.94 -0.74 0.82 -0.83 -0.68 -0.80 -0.84 
Judicial independence -0.23 -0.92 -0.85 -0.80 0.79 -0.86 -0.63 -0.88 -0.90 
Procedural formalism -0.07 0.59 0.54 0.89 -0.84 0.72 0.45 0.40 0.50 
Affordability of legal system -0.17 0.24 0.08 0.24 -0.41 0.32 -0.47 0.17 0.02 
Uninterrupted democracy -0.23 -0.77 -0.81 -0.78 0.80 -0.73 -0.69 -0.58 -0.67 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.21 -0.95 -0.89 -0.81 0.77 -0.91 -0.77 -0.94 -0.96 
          
 Exp. share of 
subnat. levels
Rev. share 
(rate auton.)
Impartial 
courts 
Judicial inde-
pendence 
Procedural 
formalism
Affordability 
of legal syst.
Uninterrupt-
ed democr.
Log(GDP 
per capita)  
Exp. Share of subnat. levels 1.00                
Revenue share (rate autonomy) 0.38 1.00        
Impartial courts 0.50 0.47 1.00       
Judicial independence 0.21 0.37 0.90 1.00      
Procedural formalism -0.03 -0.29 -0.67 -0.71 1.00     
Affordability of legal system 0.02 0.37 -0.30 -0.31 0.22 1.00    
Uninterrupted democracy 0.55 0.52 0.93 0.81 -0.81 -0.21 1.00   
Log(GDP per capita) 0.38 0.51 0.88 0.91 -0.60 -0.12 0.77 1.00  
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Table A6. Competition and rents in the public bureaucracy (based on Euro-Barometer) 
Dependent variable       
Life satisfaction differential 
for public bureaucrats I II III IV V VI 
Internal competition       
 Total cost of market entry 0.016 
(0.013) 
     
 Ease of starting business  -0.006* 
(0.003) 
    
 Administrative obstacles   0.010(*) 
(0.006) 
   
 Price controls    0.005 
(0.003) 
  
External competition       
 Taxes on international trade     -0.002 
(0.006) 
 
 Regulatory trade barriers      0.007 
(0.005) 
Control variable       
 Log(GDP per capita) -0.001 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
Constant 0.012 
(0.086) 
-0.043 
(0.050) 
-0.096 
(0.074) 
-0.029 
(0.052) 
0.021 
(0.062) 
-0.116 
(0.097) 
Number of observations  23  30  30  30  30  30 
R2  0.04  0.09  0.10  0.17  0.07  0.09 
Notes: (1) Generalized least square estimations; (2) ** is significant at the 99 percent level, * at the 95 percent level, and (*) at 
the 90 percent level; (3) standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: Euro-Barometer Survey Series, 1989-1994, Graham and Felton (2005) based on Latinobarometer 1997, 2000, 2001 
and 2003, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004), Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) and Gwartney and Lawson (2004). 
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Table A7. Institutions and rents in the public bureaucracy (based on Euro-Barometer)  
Dependent variable        
Life satisfaction differential 
for public bureaucrats I II III IV V VI VII 
Fiscal federalism        
 Expenditure share of sub-
national levels 
-4E-4 
(4E-4) 
      
 Revenue share (rate 
autonomy) 
 -0.036 
(0.029) 
     
Judiciary        
 Impartial courts   -0.008** 
(0.002) 
    
 Judicial independence    -0.006** 
(0.002) 
   
 Procedural formalism     0.011* 
(0.004) 
  
 Affordability of legal system      -5E-4 
(0.005) 
 
Uninterrupted democracy       -0.029** 
(0.009) 
Control variable        
 Log(GDP per capita) 0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
0.022** 
(0.007) 
0.018* 
(0.007) 
0.012(*) 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.016* 
(0.006) 
Constant -0.020 
(0.045) 
0.177 
(0.168) 
-0.147* 
(0.055) 
-0.125* 
(0.056) 
-0.151 
(0.076) 
-0.068 
(0.071) 
-0.124* 
(0.058) 
Number of observations  29  9  30  30  29  21  21 
R2  0.12  0.20  0.36  0.29  0.20  0.15  0.26 
Notes: (1) Generalized least square estimations; (2) ** is significant at the 99 percent level, * at the 95 percent level, and (*) at the 90 percent level; (3) standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Sources: Euro-Barometer Survey Series, 1989-1994, Graham and Felton (2005) based on Latinobarometer 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003, World Bank (2000; 2001; 2002), 
Stein (1999), Treisman (2000; 2002), OECD (2000), Gwartney and Lawson (2004) and Djankov et al. (2003). 
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Table A8. Corruption and rents in the public bureaucracy (based on Euro-
Barometer) 
Dependent variable     
Life satisfaction differential 
for public bureaucrats I II III IV 
Corruption     
 General corruption 0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
  
 Irregular payments   0.013** 
(0.003) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
Control variables     
 Protestants  -2E-4* 
(8E-5) 
 -1E-4 
(1E-4) 
 Political stability  0.003 
(0.004) 
 0.001 
(0.004) 
 Log(GDP per capita) 0.025** 
(0.008) 
0.017(*) 
(0.008) 
0.025** 
(0.007) 
0.019* 
(0.008) 
Constant -0.252** 
(0.088) 
-0.184(*) 
(0.091) 
-0.262** 
(0.074) 
-0.198* 
(0.080) 
Number of observations  30  30  30  30 
R2  0.41  0.49  0.45  0.51 
Notes: (1) Generalized least square estimations; (2) ** is significant at the 99 percent level, * at the 95 
percent level, and (*) at the 90 percent level; (3) standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: Euro-Barometer Survey Series, 1989-1994, Graham and Felton (2005) based on Latinobarometer 
1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004), Gwartney and Lawson (2004), 
Heston, Summers and Aten (2002), La Porta et al. (2004), Central Intelligence Agency (1992) and 
Statisticni urad republike slovenije (1996). 
 
